



## VIETNAM SWANS



## ANZAC DAY TOUR 23 – 25 April 2010



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## *Australian Military Involvement in Vietnam*

Following the defeat of the French Army at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 in the First Indo-China War, Vietnam was partitioned at the 17th Parallel. The communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) (DRV) took control in the northern half of the country and the non-communist Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in the south. From the late 1950s, a civil war developed in South Vietnam between the communist supported National Liberation Front (NLF) with its military arm the Viet Cong (VC) and the US backed Government of Ngo Dinh Diem. The war intensified in 1963, following the assassination of Diem and his replacement by a series of unstable 'revolving door' governments.

On 3 August 1962, following negotiations with the United States and at the request of the RVN, 30 Australian Army training advisers arrived in South Vietnam to join US Army advisers in what later became Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). Their tasks primarily were to assist in training RVN ground forces in jungle warfare, village defence and related activities. The Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) strength peaked at 202 in December 1970.

Due to a deteriorating military situation in South Vietnam in late 1964 and early 1965, the United States proposed the introduction of sizeable ground forces. Following RVN agreement, in May 1965, 1RAR was deployed to Bien Hoa, north-east of Saigon. It joined the US 173 Airborne Brigade as the third battalion of the Brigade. Australian and New Zealand artillery batteries, as well as other supporting arms and services units, later joined. In addition to its responsibilities for the security of the Bien Hoa air base, 173 Airborne Brigade conducted a significant range of operations against VC forces throughout III Corps Tactical Zone (IICTZ). The tactical zone included the RVN capital city, Saigon, lying between the IICTZ of the Central Highlands and the IVCTZ incorporating the Mekong Delta.

In May 1966, a major increase in the size of the Army's combat element occurred following the relief of 1RAR, after one year's service, by 1 Australian Task Force (1ATF). This force was a brigade sized formation comprising a headquarters, two infantry battalions (5RAR, 6RAR) and elements from all supporting arms and services. It was based at Nui Dat in Phuoc Tuy Province located on the coast, east of Saigon, within IICTZ.

1ATF was given tactical responsibility for the security of the province, excluding the populated areas, working in close coordination with RVN forces. 1 Australian Logistic Support Group (1ALSG), located at Vung Tau, a coastal town and port immediately south of Phuoc Tuy, provided logistic support for 1ATF. While both 1ATF and 1ALSG (as well as AATTV, RAN and RAAF units) were under national command of Headquarters Australian Force Vietnam (HQAFV) located in Saigon, 1ATF was under operational control of the equivalent of a US Army corps headquarters - Headquarters II Field Force Vietnam (HQIFFV) - located at Long Binh, east of Saigon. No 9 Squadron RAAF, equipped with Iroquois (UH-1) helicopters, and based at Vung Tau, supported 1ATF operations, as did, to a much lesser degree, Caribou equipped No 35 Squadron RAAF.

Infantry battalions, artillery batteries and SAS squadrons were relieved on a yearly basis, with the remainder of the force being on individual replacement. Additional battalions were raised to give the RAR a strength of nine battalions, while additional supporting arms and services units were raised. At its peak strength in 1969, the Australian Army in Vietnam totalled more than 7,000 personnel. Over the ten years of the war, more than 50,000 Army, Air Force and Navy personnel served in Vietnam.

Initially 1ATF met little serious opposition, but on 18 August 1966, D Coy 6RAR, on a fighting patrol to clear suspected recoilless rifle and mortar sites, encountered a large enemy force in the Long Tan rubber plantation east of Nui Dat. In a number of attempts to over-run D Company, a large force of VC and North Vietnamese suffered heavy casualties from artillery fire, the small arms fire of the company and the machine guns of the armoured relief force. The United States Presidential Unit Citation was awarded to D Coy 6RAR for this action.

Over the next 18 months, 1ATF extended its control over Phuoc Tuy Province with a range of task force and battalion operations. Some were undertaken in cooperation with US and RVN forces, and covered a full range of mission types from jungle patrolling to cordon and search operations of various towns and villages. A civil affairs unit was added to 1ATF in March 1967 to carry out and coordinate a vast range of construction, resettlement, medical and dental, education and welfare activities for the civil population of Phuoc Tuy. New Zealand Army infantry companies were integrated into an RAR battalion, resulting in the RAR battalion being designated 'ANZAC'. In December 1967, 1ATF was augmented by a third RAR battalion and a squadron of Centurion tanks.

Three major operations to secure the major bases of Long Binh, Bien Hoa and the capital Saigon from VC and NVA offensives involved 1ATF operating as a formation (less one battalion and other elements securing its base) outside Phuoc Tuy Province. These were Operation Coburg in January/February 1968, Thuan Thang I in May 1968 and Federal in

February 1969. The first two operations involved significant clashes with large enemy forces. May 1968 also saw large scale enemy attacks on Australian positions in the battle of Fire Bases Coral and Balmoral and at the village of Binh Ba.

In 1969, growing disenchantment with the war, as well as US attempts to reduce casualties and prepare for disengagement, led to the emphasis in operations changing to 'pacification' - the enhancement of the security of the populated areas of the RVN, combined with the upgrading of the effectiveness of RVN forces. Notwithstanding this commitment, 1ATF offensive operations in Phuoc Tuy ensured that by 1971 there were few incursions by VC and NVA major units.

Commencing in 1968, public opinion in both Australia and the United States began to turn against the war. Exacerbated by the propaganda disaster of the communists' 1968 'Tet' Offensive, the combination of the unpopularity of conscription and the rising casualty rates, public opposition in both the US and Australia forced the political leaderships to announce the withdrawal of allied forces. In November 1970, 8RAR was withdrawn and not replaced. 1ATF withdrew from Phuoc Tuy in November 1971, followed shortly after by 1ALSG. AATTV, having been gradually reduced in strength, concentrated in Phuoc Tuy Province with the departure of 1ATF, and continued training RVN forces until the Governor General the Right Honourable Sir Paul Meernaa Caedwalla Hasluck, KG, GCMG, GCVO proclaimed the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam by Australian Forces on 11 January 1973. However, the last troops (the Australian Embassy Guard Platoon drawn from the Australian Army Assistance Group Vietnam) were not withdrawn until 1 July 1973.

For the Australian Army, the withdrawal from Vietnam represented the end of 33 years of continuous operational duties, which had commenced with World War II, continued through the occupation of Japan, the Korean War, the Malayan Emergency and Indonesian Confrontation to the Second Indo-China War in Vietnam. Army casualties in Vietnam were 413 KIA/DoW, two MIA, 2026 WIA, 64 non-battle deaths and 999 other casualties.

## *The Battle of Long Tan*

The newly arrived 1st Australian Task Force established its Phuoc Tuy operations base in 1966 at Nui Dat, a piece of high ground surrounded by rubber plantations.

The Viet Cong had achieved dominion in the province and decided to inflict a politically unacceptable defeat on the Australians. Their plan was to lure the Australians from their base by firing recoilless rifle and mortar shells into it. They theorised that the Australians would sweep the area around the base in an attempt to stop the attacks, and the Viet Cong would ambush the sweeping forces.

On the night of 16/17 August 1966, the Viet Cong fired a barrage of shells into Nui Dat, wounding 24 Australians. Prior to this event, the Australians had become aware, from radio intercepts and sightings, that a large enemy force was operating close to the base. Australian patrols sent out specifically to find the Viet Cong had not encountered the force.

On 18 August 1966 D Company of 6RAR was patrolling in the area of the Long Tan rubber plantation when, at about 3.15pm, the lead platoon (11 Platoon, commanded by 2Lt Gordon Sharp, a national serviceman) encountered a small group of Viet Cong who fled leaving one of their number killed by the Australians. The aggressive patrolling continued until, at about 4.08pm, the main body of the Viet Cong 275 Regiment was encountered. The Viet Cong attacked vigorously with mortars, rifle and machine gun fire.



In pouring rain, the Australians returned fire with platoon weapons and artillery which was firing from the Nui Dat base, some five kilometres to the west. Close air support was also called for but couldn't be used because the target was unable to be identified accurately in the conditions.

At 5pm D Company's commander, Major Harry Smith, radioed for ammunition resupply. Two RAAF Iroquois helicopters which happened to be at Nui Dat to transport a concert party were tasked and flew at tree top level into the battle area where they successfully delivered the sorely needed boxes of ammunition.

The combination of aggressive fire from D Company soldiers plus devastating artillery fire from Nui Dat had swung the battle in the Australians' favour but the Viet Cong continued to manoeuvre to



gain the upper hand. Meanwhile, A Company of 6RAR had been ordered to move to the support of the beleaguered D Company.

They did so mounted in armoured personnel carriers from 1st APC Squadron which forded a flooded stream and then shortly afterward encountered a substantial enemy force. 2 Platoon of A Company dismounted and advanced on the enemy who fled.

Although the Viet Cong could still be seen massing in failing light at 6.55pm as the relief force arrived in the D Company area, the enemy force melted away as darkness descended. The battle of Long Tan was over.



The Australians consolidated their position for the night and then commenced evacuation of their wounded using the lights from APCs to guide in helicopters. During the night the Viet Cong cleared many of their wounded and dead from the battle field. A number of the wounded Australians lay there all through the long terrifying night, as the Viet Cong moved around them.

Morning revealed that the Viet Cong force, estimated at 2,500, had been badly mauled. 245 Viet Cong bodies were found in the battle area. It was apparent that the Viet Cong commanders had failed to appreciate the effectiveness of artillery fire and had paid dearly as a result.

The Australians had lost 18 killed, 17 from D Company (including the young platoon commander of 11 platoon) and one from 1st APC Squadron, and 24 wounded.

## The Battle of Binh Ba

by Arthur Burke

Twenty-five years after the Allied landing at Normandy on 6 June 1944, another military force also crossed a start line and advanced into history at the small rubber plantation village of Binh Ba in South Vietnam.

The peaceful morning air of Phuoc Tuy Province in South Vietnam was shattered at 7.20 am by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) striking the turret of an Australian Centurion tank as it entered the village of Binh Ba, some six kilometres north of the Australian base at Nui Dat. Forty-eight hours later, the vicious Battle of Binh Ba concluded leaving one Australian dead and 10 wounded, but at least 107 enemy killed, six wounded and 29 detained for further investigation. This battle on 6 June 1969 was an undeniable success for the Australians and ranks as one of the major military victories of that force during the Vietnam War.



AWM MISC/69/0525/VN. Binh Ba, South Vietnam. At the rubber plantation village.

The question has often been asked, ‘Was this an ambush or an accident?’ Was the RPG fired by a nervous young local Viet Cong (VC) guerilla or a trigger-happy North Vietnamese Regular, or was this a deliberate attempt by 1st Battalion of 33rd North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment to entice two Australian armoured vehicles into a trap which would draw resources away from the 6th Battalion Royal Australian Regimental (6 RAR) Group which was exerting pressure on the enemy from further north? This article tells the story of that modern D-Day battle and leaves the reader to make a decision.

The 6th Battalion had not long been in country and was still undergoing its warm-up or nursery operation which had commenced towards the end of May in an area some 17 km north of Nui Dat. Their supposedly rather benign patrolling southwards had, however, inadvertently begun to encroach upon the cross-country movement of an NVA battalion which was temporarily laying up in the former French rubber plantation village of Binh Ba. There is no doubt that it felt threatened by the hammer and anvil effect of 6 RAR pushing south towards the defended Nui Dat base.



AWM BEL/69/0382/VN. Binh Ba, South Vietnam. 6 June 1969. Troops of D Company, 5th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (5RAR), Commanded by Major Murray Blake, supported by Centurion tanks of B Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, sweep towards the edge of a rubber plantation, five miles north of the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) Base at Nui Dat.

The RPG which hit the replacement tank -- being accompanied to 6 RAR by an armoured recovery vehicle (ARV) -- seriously wounded the loader/operator and prevented the turret from traversing. The crew commander opened fire with a .30 calibre machine gun and was supported by the fire from two similar weapons on the ARV. The tank continued north to a nearby friendly village post whilst the recovery vehicle withdrew south to Nui Dat.

The tank's arrival alerted the Vietnamese Regional Force (RF) Company who prepared to react against an enemy of (at that time) unknown strength. In parallel, the tank's contact report sent by radio to the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) base and a request for assistance from the Vietnamese District Chief resulted in the task force's ready reaction force -- based on D Company 5 RAR -- being mobilised at about 9 am.



AWM BEL/69/0386/VN. Binh Ba, South Vietnam. June 1969. Commander of an armoured personnel carrier (APC) of B Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, keeps a sharp look out into a banana plantation on the roadside near Binh Ba. Australian troops inflicted heavy casualties on a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Force which entered Binh Ba, five miles north of the 1st Australian Task Force base at Nui Dat.

Paul Stevens, a young lieutenant artillery forward observer from 105th Field Battery was attached to D Company at that time. He recalls, 'We were ordered to move to Binh Ba, join up with a tank troop, liaise with the [Vietnamese] Sector Commander, and, when given the go ahead, push the VC out of the village.' The group deployed in armoured personnel carriers (APCs) as reports from the RF company then being engaged by heavy fire in the north escalated the original estimates of an irregular enemy force of a couple of platoons. On arrival at Binh Ba, Stevens saw Vietnamese villagers being evacuated -- an obvious prelude to approval being given for the Australians' assault -- and mused that this could be a possible escape route for some Viet Cong.

At 11.20 am, the waiting force in the east came under heavy RPG fire and the District Chief immediately told D Company commander, Major Murray Blake to 'do what you have to do'. The import of this decision was not underrated because the inevitable collateral damage -- especially from the tanks' 83.4 mm main armament -- to homes in the village would be substantial. The reaction force advanced, 2nd Lieutenant Brian Sullivan's composite four tank-troop leading and Captain Ray De Vere's APCs ferrying D Company followed.



AWM P00800.052. Binh Ba, Vietnam. 1969. A house in the village.

Some 600 m south of the village a machine gun fired near a flanking tank. In reply, four shotgun-type 83.4 mm cannister and 1000 tank machine gun rounds silenced this opposition. The tanks halted about 300 m from the nearest houses and the infantry dismounted and spread out between the APCs. Desultory enemy RPG fire aimed at the tanks began, but the RPG gunners were shooting beyond effective range. The tanks returned fire, but an RPG then fired from the next house. It was not until the tank commanders began noting the house from which fire emanated, pausing, then firing at the next house that RPG fire decreased.

The village of Binh Ba was about 200 m north to south and 500 m east to west. It was constructed in a grid divided by four roads/tracks running east to west. The buildings were constructed of concrete walls, tiled roofs and contained wooden doors and shuttered windows. De Vere ordered elements of his force to each block of houses, one tank with APCs in support leading every group. A mopping-up force of APCs carrying infantrymen brought up the rear. Up above, a light fire support team of RAAF Bushrangers (two Iroquois helicopters equipped with mini-guns, machine guns and rockets) engaged enemy who tried to escape from the village.

The next two hours were a mixture of cameo memories for all concerned. Tank troop commander Brian Sullivan vividly describes two tank rounds hitting a house simultaneously with such force from their explosion that the roof lifted, the walls crumbled and it was possible to see clearly through the intervening space before the roof crashed down to ground level. Sullivan soon realised that if tank gun rounds were directed at the wooden doors of houses, the 20-pound rounds exploded inside, blowing out the shutters but containing most of the shrapnel within the building and reducing overall external destruction. This method dealt very effectively with enemy inside a house.

The resistance was far stiffer than could have been possible for two platoons of VC and the determination to engage tanks reflected a strong NVA component. A United States' Air Force Forward Air Controller ('Jade 5') offered his services but De Vere declined and himself directed helicopter gunships' rocket fire to effect upon a group of troublesome houses.

A significant number of enemy escaping south-west were reported from a Sioux helicopter flown by 2nd Lieutenant Peter Rogers and carrying 5 RAR's intelligence officer, Captain Mike Battle. Tank commander 2nd Lieutenant Dave Ritchie saw an opportunity and with another tank gave chase. The second tank sustained heavy RPG fire and was disabled. Its wounded crew had to be evacuated and the vehicle temporarily abandoned.



AWM BEL/69/0389/VN. Binh Ba. Centurion tanks from 1st Armoured Regiment, and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) from B Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, move along the main road of the village past Plantation Gallia. Armour together with infantry dislodged a strong North Vietnamese Army (NVA) group which had entered the village.

By 1.30 pm, crewman on three of the four tanks had been wounded, tank ammunition had been expended and relief by Sergeant Jock Browning's troop was welcomed. Major Blake's infantry force dismounted, reformed on the western end of the village and at 2 pm swept through again using similar tactics to the morning's. It was now obvious that each house had a bunker below in which enemy had escaped detection during the initial sweep. After each tank/APC had fired into a building, the infantry entered and hand-to-hand fighting increased in tempo.

Paul Stevens found himself without any artillery tasks because of the close fighting and describes how the command vehicle had collected a platoon commander who had been wounded when he came face to face with a VC on entering a house. The officer had then survived a grenade blast before dispatching the enemy with a shot from his rifle.

The courage and leadership of junior ranks was superb. Of the 21 rifle sections involved, twelve were commanded by private soldiers. Two platoons were led by sergeants and one by a corporal. By last light, the assault force had completed this second sweep and were exhausted. Major Rein Harring's B Company 5 RAR had moved into a blocking position south of the village during the day and the battalion's commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Colin Khan had been in a forward tactical headquarters at a village just to the north of Binh Ba since noon.

Attention now focussed on the gun end of 105th Field Battery in Nui Dat which began receiving incoming rockets at about 7.30 pm. Gun Position Officer, Lieutenant Arthur Burke recorded the nearest landing some 60 m from one field gun and another 100 m from the ammunition dump. The mortar locating radars obtained a fix on the enemy's firing point and the gunners manned their guns in retaliation. The enemy ceased firing but as the battery began to clean up after an hour's firing, B Company 5 RAR reported a contact and the guns opened up in support. That evening a huge harassing and interdiction target list was handed down to the 105th which kept the gunners busy all night.

At 6 am next morning, 7 June, B Company to the south of Binh Ba engaged an enemy force of company strength after first mistaking them for friendly Vietnamese soldiers—at first both sides waved to each other! As D Company now prepared to sweep through Binh Ba village in a final clean-up, some 80 enemy were observed in a rubber factory at Duc Trung, 1000 m north. A Vietnamese reaction force assisted by elements of 5 RAR were tasked but the enemy slipped out of the noose.



BEL/69/0388/VN. Binh Ba, South Vietnam. June 1969. Bodies of dead North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops who attempted to hold the rubber plantation village are laid out in an open area so they can be checked for documents before burial.

D Company began its sweep from the west. The gruelling tasks of bringing out the dead and searching them for documents, accepting the surrender of wounded enemy, relieving hiding civilians, and stockpiling captured weapons and ammunition made for a slow and distasteful process. The macabre scene of the day was the enemy dead in the village square, laid out under the District Chief's orders for a salutary warning to villagers not to harbour the enemy. One bright spot in this day were papers which identified the enemy as a battalion of NVA regulars who had been trying to sneak across Phuoc Tuy Province to a sanctuary in its northeast. D Company was not surprised that they had been regulars, but were very relieved at the outcome of the battle.

About 1 pm, heavy firing broke out around Duc Trung village to the north and the District Chief reported that the RF platoon had been overrun by about 100 enemy. Artillery fire was brought down amongst the withdrawing enemy on the northern edge of the hamlet whilst helicopter gunships assisted in containing them till B Company 5 RAR with four tanks arrived within 20 minutes. The southern part of Duc Trung was then secured, but the enemy was so intermingled with the civilians in the north that it was agreed RF troops should conduct the sweep of that area. Artillery and Bushrangers continued to harass the withdrawing enemy. Arthur Burke at the gun end of 105th Battery wrote, 'We've fired more rounds in the last 48 hours than the first 20 days of last month -- 2000 rounds'. B Company blocked northwest of Duc Trung that night.



These are the times that try men's souls. T Paine. From *The Year of the Tigers*, edited by Captain MR Battle, 1970. p56.

D Company completed its clearance of Binh Ba at 5.15 pm and went into a night blocking position in the rubber to the south-west of the village. Despite expectations of an NVA return, the night was mercifully peaceful. Paul Stevens described it as ‘deliciously cool, and the lanes of [rubber] trees stretched as far as the eye could see. From the outside, even the village looked peaceful.’

The Battle of Binh Ba or by its military name, Operation HAMMER concluded at 8 am on 8 June after a final sweep of the village. An hour later, Australian Civil Affairs personnel arrived to guide and assist the resettlement of the villagers. Task Force Commander Brigadier Sandy Pearson and Lieutenant Colonel Colin Khan spoke with the weary but proud troops prior to their return to base.

The words of a presentation at the Royal Australian Infantry Corps Conference in 1981 aptly summarise this operation.

The contact at Binh Ba was characterised by vicious hand to hand fighting of an intensity rarely equalled during our period in Vietnam. The close support of the tanks was vital in allowing infantry to enter and clear houses. Engagements were at close quarters requiring high volume, short-range fire ... Binh Ba was a magnificent example of close cooperation between infantry and tanks against a determined, dug-in enemy.

In this vicious battle, a large enemy force was defeated by rapid reaction, skill, courage and firepower. The Battle of Binh Ba is well credited in the 5 RAR book, *The Year of the Tigers* as ‘one of the major military victories of the Australian Force in Vietnam’. However, whether it was triggered as an ambush or by accident remains a mystery.

## The Tunnel Rat

The leading scout raised his arm in the village of Long Phuoc  
He'd found another tunnel, but who'd go down to look?  
The corporal passed the word back, it went back far behind  
To let his platoon commander know of his recent find

Then along came this soldier, with mud from head to toe  
"Where's the tunnel entrance?" was all he wanted to know  
When they showed the soldier, he quickly looked around  
And before you could stop him, he'd gone underground

Now he'd been searching on his gut, all that day I bet  
Look out for booby traps that good ol' Charlie sets  
Then he found the wire, stretched out taut and thin  
But he deloused that booby trap, with a safety pin

Then he found the weapons leaning on the wall  
There was no disputing he'd found a real big haul  
When he finally surfaced, wearing a big grin  
He proudly showed the Diggers what he'd found within

Now he'd like to sit down, and roll himself a smoke  
But he's been called up forward, by another bloke  
So when you see that hat badge, that's like a bursting shell  
Remember that this fellow has crawled half way through to hell

And if he's in a bar mate, you buy that bloke a beer  
Because Sir, you're drinking with an Aussie Engineer

## Accommodation:


Hanoi Tourers are at the **Imperial Hotel** :

159 Thuy Van Street, Vung Tau City,  
Vietnam  
Vung Tau, Viet Nam  
(064) 362 8888



Saigon Tourers are at the **Palace Hotel** :

01 Nguyen Trai St,  
Ward 1, Vung Tau City  
0907 231 660  
064 3856 411



Saigon Tourers: Please quote your Reservation Number when you arrive; the Reservation number is in the attached list at the head of each table below. You pay for your own accommodation through the hotel.

<b>RES. No. 41190 - Friday and Saturday only</b>	
<b>TRIPLES</b>	<b>TWINS</b>
Simon Philip David BEST	Ricky Leslie Gaffney
Jessica Hang Bich BEST	Brian Joseph O'Reilly
Hamish Tobias Peter BEST	
	Michael Scott Smith
Mark Greenshields	Philip Johns
Kylie Greenshields	
Oscar Greenshields (child)	Tracy O'Brien
Archie Greenshields (child)	Catherine Anne Meinrath
<b>DOUBLES</b>	<b>SINGLES</b>
Danny Monk	Rowan Laird Luke
Kelsey Jamieson	
	Joshua David Little
Derrin James Limbrick	
Fleur Traeger Gamble	David Winston Hadley
Merilyn Liddell	Samuel Conroy
Michael Lidell	
	Mark Williams
Stewart John Davies	
Gemma Clare Considine	
William Crang	<b>COLOUR KEY</b>
Bethany Young	SINGLE
	TWIN ROOM
Joslyn Maree Gresham	DOUBLE ROOM
Trevor Michael Gresham	TRIPLE ROOM
	APARTMENT
Robert Visentini	
Louisa Visentini	

<b>Res No 41191 - Sat night Only</b>
Name
<b>DOUBLES</b>
Lucas James Skelton
Michelle Lee Skelton

Kevin Andrew Douglas Hornblower
Kimberley Andrews

<b>TWINS</b>
Heath Bradley Ellis
Jarrold Dean

Brett Jotta
Peter Roach

<b>SINGLES</b>
Leigh Anderson

Colin Luff
------------

David John Kainey
-------------------

David John Hunter
-------------------

<b>Res No 41441 - Fri and Sat night only</b>
Name
<b>SINGLES</b>
YEBGA YEBGA ANDRE Eric

<b>APARTMENT</b>
Daniel Brian Joseph ARMSTRONG
Joanne Vicki ARMSTRONG
Emma Nicole ARMSTRONG
Sarah Danae ARMSTRONG
Jessica Elise ARMSTRONG

<b>Own accommodation</b>
Paul Schwerdt
Steven McBride
Lee Matthew Taylor
Mary Laurel Davitt
Michael Anthony Johnston
Lee Nicholls
Shannon Michael Leahy
Nicholas Shiells

## Itinerary:

Bus transfers between venues are arranged and cost only 120,000VND for all transfers

Time	Activity	Remarks
<b>Friday, 23 April 2010</b>		
0830 - 1030	Arrive Ho Chi Minh City	
930	Bus One depart for Vung Tau	POC: Daniel Kindness
1000	Bus Two departs for Vung Tau	POC: Greg Stanton
1030	Bus Three departs for Vung Tau	POC: Will Viggers
1130 - 1300	Lunch at Ba Ria, Vuon Tao Ngo, 501 Cach Mang Thang Tam Street.	150,000 VND per person
1400	Check-in Imperial Hotel	
	(SAIGON TOURERS MAKE OWN WAY THERE)	

<b>Saturday, 24 April 2010</b>		
0800 h	ALL Depart Imperial Hotel for Nui Dat Tour <i>(NOTE: SAIGON TOURERS WILL BE COLLECTED FROM PALACE HOTEL AT 0755 SHARP)</i>	4 x 35 Seater Buses
0840 h	Battlefield Tour - Nui Dat	Topography and situation brief provided by Dan Kindness from top of SAS hill. Mr John Brown to provide escorted tour of the task force position and provide brief on the key locations.
0940 h	Battlefield Tour - Long Tan	Dan Kindness to provide battle brief and arrange permission to visit site through Dat Do People's Committee.
1030 h	Long Phuoc Tunnel System	Dan Kindness to arrange attendance of museum curator.
1115 h	Return to Imperial Hotel & Palace Hotel	
1200 h	Lunch	
1300 h	Players depart hotels for Greyhound Racing Track, 15 Le Loi Street, Vung Tau.	
1330 h	Supporters depart hotels to watch footy	
1400 h	ANZAC Day Clash - Hanoi vs Saigon intra-club match.	
1600 h	Match presentations and social drinks at the grounds	
1730 h	Free Time	Buses available to take families back to hotels
<b>Sunday, 25 April 2010</b>		
0400 h	Transport departs for Long Tan Cross from Imperial and Palace	
0500 h	ANZAC Day Service Commences	
0530 h	Dawn	
0600 h	Tour of Long Tan	Opportunity to provide brief to Saigon members as well as opportunity to talk to veterans.
0720 h	Return to Vung Tau via Horshoe and barrier mine field.	
0830 h	Optional: Visit to Minh Dam memorial to pay respect to Vietnamese fallen.	
0930 h	Move to Tommy's Sports Bar, 3 Ba Cu St, Vung Tau	
1130 h	Essendon vs Collingwood ANZAC Day clash	
1230 h	Buffet Lunch	Tommy's Sports Bar
1230 h	<b>Bus One to airport</b>	1 x 35 Seater Bus
1400 h	Crown and Anchor / Two Up	Tommy's Sports Bar
1500 h	<b>Bus Two to airport</b>	1 x 35 Seater Bus
1500 h	<b>Bus Three to Saigon</b>	
1600 h	<b>Bus One arrives airport</b>	
1800 h	<b>Bus Two arrives airport</b>	
1800 h	<b>Bus Three arrives Saigon</b>	
2000 h	North Melbourne vs Hawthorn	Tommy's Sports Bar

## Dress Code for the Dawn Service:

We're guests in Vietnam and we come to pay respects to the fallen.

**Highly recommended is dress pants, shoes and collared shirt tucked in for men, with women a similar standard.**

The **minimum** is sandals, dress shorts, collared shirt not tucked in.

Singlets, t-shirts, board shorts and thongs are **not appropriate**.

**SWANS PLAYERS STANDARD: Our new collared club shirts tucked in, pants and shoes (or dress shorts and sandals).**

## Emergency Contacts:

### SOS Medical Centre - Vung Tau

1 Le Ngoc Han Street, Ward 1

Vung Tau City, Vietnam

Opening hours

Monday to Friday 8am to 5pm

Saturday 8am to 12pm

Tel: 84 (0) 643 858 776

Tel: 84 (0) 83 829 8520 – 24 Hour alert



Tour Organiser: **Daniel Kindness** – 0903 465 529

Interpreter: **Helen Kindness** – 0935 415 084

Vietnam Swans National President: **Phil Johns** – 0933032296

Swans HCMC President: **Derrin Limbrick** - 0907944879

Swans Hanoi President: **Mark Williams** - 0904 107 024

Swans Hanoi Coach: **Greg Stanton** – 0128 3624 961

Bus Coordinator: **Will Viggers** – 0165 7416 037

All Round Good Guy: **Phil Murphy** – 0904831832

All Round Good Guy (Southern edition) – **Matt Townsend** – 0908 021 015